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Abstract
Migration (international or local migration) of individuals/workers is viewed as a channel through which 
workers’ remittances have become a major source of income for developing countries; resources are repatri-
ated from the source country to service foreign nationals or home economy while it creates an internal brain 
drain between local migrants and likely an increased outmigration of workers/individuals. However, little is 
still known about their impact on the economic development in the origin countries. This paper analyses 
whether, and to what extent, these downsides of international migration of workers affects origin countries. 
Consequently, using a household survey-based and secondary sources dataset our results show that remit-
tances in Nigeria are positively and significantly viable in their contribution to economic growth (proxy by 
gross domestic product) in some Sub-Saharan African countries and have reduced poverty to some extent.
Keywords: Remittances, economic growth, migration, development, Nigeria.
1 Introduction
For decades the migration debate has focused on 
the impact of immigration on destination countries. 
Very recently, however, attention has increasingly 
turned to the situation in the countries of origin, 
developing countries in particular, with a focus on 
the interplay between migration and development. 
Three compensatory mechanisms offer migrants’ 
countries of origin a possibility for avoiding the per-
manent loss of knowledge and qualified labour due 
to migration (i.e. the brain drain) as well as a means 
of escaping from the poverty trap. Firstly, circular 
migration – the practice of migrating back and forth 
between the countries of origin and destination – 
can create, at a minimum, the potential for increased 
knowledge exchange, if not gain (brain gain). Sec-
ondly, diaspora communities can serve as a conduit 
for developing trade connections, increasing the 
transfer of capital and exchanging technology. Finally, 
the steady growth of remittances from migrants to 
families back home can significantly help reduce pov-
erty in recipient communities. 
Nigeria plays a key role in African migrations. As 
Africa’s demographic giant, Nigeria has become 
increasingly involved in international migration to 
Europe, the Gulf countries and South Africa. Yet 
Nigeria is also a source and destination country of 
migration within West Africa (Adepoju 2004). Con-
sidering the key role Nigeria plays in African migra-
tion systems, its role as destination, transit and 
source country, and considering the fact that it is 
confronted with both the negative and positive 
dimensions of migration, improved systematic
insight in the views and interests of Nigerian state 
and non-state stakeholders is essential in designing 
more effective migration and development.
On the other hand, remittances have become 
significant private financial resources for households 
in countries of origin of migration, although they can-
not be considered as a substitute for foreign direct 
investment (FDI), official development assistance 
(ODA), debt relief or other public sources of finance 
development. There has been a 15-fold increase in 
remittances to developing countries since 1988, with 
remittances increasing from $20 billion to $328 bil-
lion in 2007. This makes it important to continue to 
analyse the potential of migrants’ remittances to 
contribute to development. Though there is a grow-
ing literature on the impact of remittances on devel-
opment, very few studies have empirically estimated 
the impact of remittances on development in gen-
eral, especially in origin countries. To fill this gap in 
the literature, this study undertakes an impact analy-
sis of remittances.
The gap between migrants from developing 
countries to developed countries and to other devel-
oping countries has reduced over time. In 2005, the 
migrant stock from developing countries to devel-
oped countries was around 53 per cent, while to 
other developing countries it was around 47 per 
cent. Studies have pointed out that most migration, 
and especially the migration of the poor, takes place 
between developing countries. In terms of number 
of emigrants, developing countries take the lead and 
account for around 95 per cent of total emigrants. 
The remittance flows are accordingly much higher 
to developing countries. In 2008, the top 10 remit-
tances-receiving countries were developing coun-
tries. In 2007, the total remittances to developing 
countries through official sources was estimated at 53
http://aps.journals.ac.za/
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ferred through unofficial sources (World Bank, 
2009). For many developing countries, the remit-
tance flow has grown not only in size but also in 
importance in terms of their share of GDP. In many 
developing countries, more than 20 per cent of GDP 
is contributed by remittances. In this context, it 
becomes important to estimate the impact of remit-
tances on poverty levels in developing countries. 
Using the panel data for 77 developing countries for 
the period 1980-2008, the study estimates the 
impact of remittances on poverty headcount ratios.
The goal of this study is the critical examination 
of remittances as a link between the migration and 
development debates. It focuses on the migration 
patterns in Nigeria with emphasis on the Lagos Sur-
vey (2010) and then extends the study to other 
countries. Secondly, it takes into account the proce-
dures and motives for such transfers as well as an 
overview of current trends and figures. It then 
addresses the importance of remittances with 
respect to poverty reduction, income distribution, 
spending habits, education, health, investment and 
growth as well as the national balance of payments in 
developing countries. Finally, the conclusion 
addresses the question of whether migration and the 
resulting flow of funds could evolve into a spring-
board for development in these countries.
To gain this insight, this study aims at identifying 
key issues, obstacles and potential synergies in max-
imising the positive effects of migration and remit-
tances on national development and minimising the 
negative effects from the perspective of the Nigerian 
state, key civil society actors and their organisations. 
This goal has been achieved through the study of 
available documentation (articles, reports, policy 
documents, undocumented notes) and series of 
interviews and institutions ranging from Nigerian 
ministries and agencies, local NGOs, European and 
African foreign embassies to several multilateral 
organisations such as the IOM, WORLDBANK, ILO 
and ECOWAS. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: 
section two provides a brief background and review 
of literature. Section three discusses the data 
sources and econometric technique and section four 
focuses on the conclusion and policy implications of 
the study.
2  Background and literature review
2.1 Nigerian migration
2.1.1 Basic facts on Nigeria
With an estimated over 160 million inhabitants, 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. It 
became a British protectorate in 1891 (although ini-
tially this mainly comprised the coastal areas), and 
became independent in 1960. Nigeria has more than 
250 different ethnic and linguistic groups, with the 
major divide running between the predominantly 
Muslim north and the predominantly Christian 
south. The largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-
Fulani (north), Yoruba (southwest) and Ibo (south-
east). Nigeria is a federal republic, with the 36 states 
enjoying considerable political and juridical auton-
omy. Lagos is the country’s economic capital and, 
with an estimated population of between 10 to 15.5 
million people, Africa’s second largest city. Centrally 
located Abuja was proclaimed the nation’s capital in 
1976, located in the federal capital territory state, 
although the actual move from Lagos to Abuja took 
place in 1991. Other major cities are Kano in the 
north, Ibadan in the southwest and Port Harcourt in 
the southeast, the latter a major site of oil refineries. 
From 1966 until 1999, Nigeria was ruled by several 
military dictators, except for a short period of civilian 
administration between 1979 and 1983. Besides the 
several coups, the country’s history has been charac-
terised by a series of minor and major violent inter-
ethnic conflicts, the bloodiest of which was the 
Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) between Nigeria 
and the breakaway republic of Biafra.. Democracy 
was formally restored in 1999, when current presi-
dent Olusegun Obasanjo was elected. Nigeria is an 
influential member of the African Union and the 
Commonwealth of Nations. It is also a member of 
and hosts the secretariat of the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS), which was 
founded in 1975.
Despite the country’s oil wealth, many Nigerians 
suffer from extreme poverty. Between 1980 and 
2000, per capita income fell. In 2004, GNI per capita 
stood at 400 US$, lower than the 510 US$ average 
for all low-income countries. In the same year, life 
expectancy at birth was 45 years against a 58 years 
average for low income countries. Approximately 90 
million Nigerians are believed to live in absolute pov-
erty, on less than one dollar a day.54 http://aps.journals.ac.za/
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scenario 
In the colonial era, parallel to rural-to-urban migra-
tion and migration to and from other African coun-
tries, Nigerians have migrated to the UK, principally 
to follow higher education. A significant proportion 
of them would stay. After independence in 1960 this 
largely highly skilled migration to the UK continued, 
although an increasing proportion of Nigerians 
migrated to the US for study, business and work.
The 1973 oil crisis and skyrocketing oil prices 
caused a tremendous (350 percent) increase in oil 
revenues. The associated economic boom made 
Nigeria into a major migration destination within 
Africa. Rising incomes of the urban middle class and 
rapid industrialisation attracted substantial numbers 
of West African labour migrants. However, the post 
1981 decrease in oil prices would herald a long 
period of economic downturn alongside sustained 
political repression and violence. In 1983 and 1985 
Nigeria expelled large numbers of West African 
migrants, including about one million Ghanaians 
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It has therefore been observed that Nigeria has 
witnessed a ‘reverse migration transition, transform-
ing itself from a net immigration to a net emigration 
country (Black et al. 2004:11). Nigerians have 
increasingly emigrated to countries such as Ghana, 
Cameroon, and particularly the wealthy economies 
of Gabon, Botswana and South Africa (cf. Adepoju 
2000). Since 1994, South Africa has developed as a 
major destination for migrants from various African 
countries, among which were many Nigerians. In 
particular, the skilled have found the booming econ-
omy of South Africa to be a convenient alternative to 
Europe, the US and the Gulf States (Adepoju 2004).
Whereas the migration of students, professionals 
and entrepreneurs to Anglo-Saxon countries has 
continued, there has been a diversification of 
Europe-bound migration following the economic 
decline and increasing political tensions in the 1980s. 
An increasing number of Nigerians have migrated to 
countries such as Germany, France, the Nether-
lands, Belgium as well as the Gulf states. In the 
1990s, Spain, Italy and Ireland have emerged as new 
major destinations of labour migrants from West 
Africa and Nigeria (cf. Black et al. 2004:9). There has 
also been an increasing tendency of Nigerian 
migrants towards permanent settlement. Increasing 
restrictions and controls on immigration to Europe 
have not led to a decrease in Nigerian emigration. 
Rather, migrants are more often un-documented and 
the itineraries tend to be longer and more perilous. 
This has made Nigerian migrants more vulnerable to 
exploitation and marginalisation.
There is circumstantial evidence that these more 
recent migrants to continental European countries 
are less skilled on average, and that they more often 
work in the (formal and, particularly in southern 
Europe, informal) service, trade and agricultural sec-
tors of the economy. The UK and, in particular the 
US (through student and professional migration as 
well as the Green Card lottery), generally continue 
to attract the relatively more highly skilled workers 
(cf. Hernandez-Coss et al. 2006). The need to 
expand the UK National Health Service has for 
instance created opportunities which poorly paid 
and unmotivated professional health workers find 
irresistible. UK universities have also embarked on a 
recruitment drive of Nigerian students. In Nigeria, 
countless immigration ‘consultants’ promise pro-
spective migrants visas and job opportunities. Also 
the Gulf States primarily have attracted the relatively 
highly skilled, at least until recently. Education has 
always been an important cause of Nigerian emigra-
tion. Some Nigerians migrate with their children to 
pursue studies in the US or the UK, to escape the 
dismal state of the Nigerian educational system. 
Labour migration from Nigeria has also become 
increasingly undertaken by women. For instance, an 
increasing number of female nurses and doctors 
have been recruited from Nigeria to work in Saudia 
Arabia (Adepoju 2000:386).
A significant number of Nigerians apply for refu-
gee status in European countries. In 2004, Nigerians 
were the fifth largest group of asylum seekers in 
Europe (Carling 2005). They tend to state ethnic and 
religious conflict as their reason for asylum. The 
cases are often denied because it is felt that there 
are many other states within Nigeria and West Africa 
for Nigerians to move to if they are faced with per-
secution at home. Because of its size and its current 
relative stability, Nigerians have less chance of 
obtaining asylum status than citizens from other, 
conflict-ridden, ECOWAS countries. The issue of 
the trafficking of female Nigerian sex workers to 
Italy and other European countries has received sub-
stantial attention. However, it seems to be impor-
tant to take into account the complexity of the issue 
as well as the blurred distinction between forced and 
voluntary migration. It is also important to make a 
distinction between trafficking and smuggling.
Most recruiting of future prostitutes takes place 
in the southern Edo state. The most important desti-
nation is Italy, where it is said that as many as 10,000 
Nigerian prostitutes are living. Secondary destina-
tions are the Netherlands, Spain and a range of other 
countries (Carling 2005). When Nigerians began 
migrating to Italy in the 1980s as a response to its 
high demand for low-skilled labour in agriculture and 
services, these women were only one of many 
groups that migrated. The first prostitutes tended to 
work independently. In the early 1990s, immigration 
restrictions made prospective emigrants increasingly 
dependent on large loans in order to pay for their 
journeys. This provided an opportunity for traffick-
ers, who enticed young women to migrate with 
promises of good jobs, and subsequently coerced 
them into prostitution to repay their migration debt 
(Carling 2005).
The initial contact with the traffickers is often 
made through a relative, friend, or other familiar 
person, who puts her in contact with a madam who 
organises and finances the journey. The costs may 
range from US$40,000 to US$100,000. The 
migrants and the madam conclude a ‘pact’, which is 
religiously sealed by a traditional priest, which 
obliges repayment in exchange for a safe passage to 
Europe (Carling 2005).56 http://aps.journals.ac.za/
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Nigerian madam, a counterpart of the Nigerian 
madam. Most women know that they are going to 
work as prostitutes, but are not necessarily aware of 
the arduous conditions under which (street) prosti-
tutes have to work as well as the size of the debt. 
However, this work does offer some ‘career’ per-
spectives.
After repaying their debt in one to three years, 
women are basically free, and it is fairly common for 
them to become supervisors of other prostitutes 
and, eventually, a madam themselves. Carling (2005) 
stressed that this prospect of upward mobility is a 
strong incentive to comply with the pact, and that 
this strong element of reciprocity between traffick-
ers and the victims makes it difficult to reduce this 
form of trafficking. Whereas labour migration and 
trafficking to Europe used to predominantly use air 
links, visa requirements and increasing immigration 
controls at air and seaports seem to have led to an 
increasing reliance on trans-Saharan, overland routes 
to the Maghreb countries, and in particular 
Morocco, from where Nigerians and other sub-
Saharan Africans attempt to cross the Mediterranean 
sea to southern Europe or the Atlantic ocean to the 
Canary Islands (de Haas 2006b). According to a 
recent study, traffickers especially in Kano state suc-
cessfully exploited the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to 
traffic children, men and women for different 
exploitative purposes e.g. prostitution, begging and 
all forms of domestic work (cf. Ehindero et al. 2006).
2.2 Stylised facts about international 
migration in Nigeria
Figure 2.1 shows the stock of Nigerian emigrants in 
the selected developed countries. Outflow of Nige-
rians to the countries under study rose systemati-
cally between 1971 and 2008. Emigration of 
Nigerians to Italy appears to be the highest among 
the countries of immigration. Nigerians in Italy were 
fewer than 20,000 in 1977-1980, but increased to 
more than 60,000 in the 1995-2000 period and in 
the 2000-2005 period; the total of working class 
Nigerians who were in Italy was computed to be 
around 1.2 million. In the case of the US, Nigerians 
were also fewer than 10,000 in the late 1970s but 
the figure rose to around 37,000 in the 1990-1995 
period and to around 50,000 in the 2000-2005 
period. Nigerians in the UK were not many com-
pared to the first two destination countries. Nigeri-
ans in the UK began to increase meaningfully from 
1985-1990 when the figure rose to 6,000. By 1995-
2000, the figure was close to 20,000 and by 2000-
2005, it was around 40,000. However, in 2005-2008, 
the outflow of Nigerians to the US and UK fell 
sharply. 
Numbers of Nigerians in Sweden and Denmark 
were very small, as they were not up to 10,000 in 
 Figure 2.1 Stock of igeria Emigrants in selected developed countries  
 Source: Computed.  Underlying data from immigration statistics yearbooks of Canada, & UK, the US 
Statistical Abstract and World Development Indicators (2007). 57
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time. Periodic growth rate of Nigerian migration 
stock is presented in Figure 2.1. Migration stock 
grew by less than 10% in the early 1990s. However, 
in the 1995-1999 period, Nigerian immigrants into 
Canada grew by 20%, but the number to the UK 
and US actually declined. In the 2000-2005 period, 
the growth rate rose to around 11% while the 
growth rate of Nigerians migrating to the US rose to 
about 5% and the growth rate of migrants to the UK 
continued to decline. It turns out that the rate at 
which Nigerians migrate to Canada was higher than 
the rate at which they migrate to US or UK, even 
though the stock of Nigerian in the US at a particular 
year is substantially greater than that of Canada. Per-
haps the reason for this is that Canada appears to be 
a country that is beginning to attract workers from 
Africa. 
2.2.3 Characteristics of Nigerian international 
migrants
Scattered evidence on the origin of Nigerian immi-
grants in Europe and the US strongly suggests that 
the majority originate from the relatively developed 
and densely populated southern provinces. The Ibo 
from the southeast and the Yoruba from the south-
west, and, to a lesser extent the Edo and the Ogoni 
ethnic groups seem to constitute the majority of 
Nigerian migrants in the UK (Hernandez-Coss et al.
2006). The majority of Nigerians trafficked to 
Europe seem to originate from Edo state, and Benin 
City in particular. Edo and to a lesser extent the 
Delta states are known as the main areas of origin of 
sex workers. The Hausa and other groups from the 
north seem relatively more oriented to migration to 
the Gulf states. The predominantly Muslim character 
of the north as well as the position of the northern 
city of Kano as a major air hub in the hadj, the Mus-
lim pilgrimage to Mecca, might partially explain this 
connection.
Reliable or even approximate data on Nigerian 
migration is generally lacking. Nigerian authorities do 
not register or estimate emigration, presumably 
reflecting the low interest in the issue. Receiving 
country statistics are incomplete, as many countries 
do not include naturalised and second-generation 
Nigerians in immigrant statistics and because of the 
substantial presence of undocumented migrants. 
Nigeria’s PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) 
estimated that more than 2 million Nigerians (mostly 
highly educated) have emigrated to Europe and the 
United States (NNPC 2004), but the empirical basis 
for this claim remains unclear. A compilation of exist-
ing migration statistics shows that more than 
300,000 first generation Nigerian migrants were 
legally living abroad at the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury (see Table 2). Although the real number is cer-
tainly higher if we include second and third 
generations as well as undocumented migrants, 
claims that “millions” of Nigerians would live abroad 
appear to be rather unlikely.
Black et al. (2004:19) refer to sources suggesting 
that nearly 15,000 Nigerians enter Europe and 
North America annually. The UK census in 2001 
reported 86,958 Nigerians living in the UK, with 
about 80 percent living in greater London. However, 
this does not include undocumented migrants and 
UK citizens of Nigerian descent (Hernandez-Coss et 
al. 2006). There are probably between 200,000 and 
300,000 first and second generation Nigerians in the 
US. This figure perhaps includes up to 21,000 Nige-
rian doctors, although these figures have been con-
tested. According to the 2000 census, 90,000 of the 
Table 1 Estimates of Nigerians living outside Africa
Country Nigerians Abroad Arrival of asylum seekers (2004)
US 160, 000  (2004; country of birth) NA
UK 88, 380   (2001; country of birth) 1, 290
Germany 16, 183   (2002; nationality) NA
Canada 10, 425   (2001; country of birth) 589
Ireland   9, 225  (2002; country of birth) NA
Netherlands    4, 564    (2003; country of birth) NA
Italy     3, 575   (1989; nationality) NA
Austria     2, 913   (2001; country of birth) 1, 828
Greece     2, 021   (2001; nationality) NA
Australia     1,783    (2001; country of birth) NA
Belgium     1, 636   (2004; nationality) NA
France     1, 425   (1999; nationality) 1, 572
Total 302, 130
Source: OECD 2006 and http://www.migrationinformation.org58 http://aps.journals.ac.za/
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or over had tertiary education (Adams 2003).
2.2.4 Recent trends in international remittances 
to Africa
Remittance refers to the portion of migrant income 
that, in the form of either funds or goods, flows back 
into the country of origin, primarily to support fami-
lies back home. The greater share of these largely 
monetary flows benefits developing countries. In the 
last few decades the volume of migrants’ remit-
tances worldwide has risen steadily (in nominal and 
relative terms) and currently represents a substantial 
source of revenue for many poor states. 
From the use of banks, credit institutions or 
money transfer companies like Western Union and 
MoneyGram to the personal transportation of cash 
or goods during trips back home, various means 
exist for transferring remittances to the recipient 
country. Information concerning cross-border 
money flows is only available on funds sent through 
formal channels, as these are the only channels that 
national banks are able to monitor. Experts estimate 
that undocumented transactions via informal chan-
nels are, in fact, well above officially documented fig-
ures. Informal methods of transferring money differ 
from country to country. In addition to the personal 
transport of funds, money can be sent through the 
mail or via a third party. 
Before the advent of the financial and economic 
crises, international remittances flowing into devel-
oping countries had been attracting increasing atten-
tion because of their rising volume and their impact 
on the recipient countries (Anyanwu and Erihijakpor, 
2009a, 2010). However, the crises have reversed the 
current trend. It has been estimated that in 2008, 
international remittances going to developing coun-
tries totalled US$337.8 billion out of the global 
amount of US$420.1 billion (a 5.3% fall) while the 
flows to developing countries fell to US$317.2 billion 
(a 6.1% decline). Though those flows are under-
reported, a high proportion of the reported flows 
went to Africa. Between 2000 and 2008, remit-
tances to the continent increased by about 263.7 
percent, from US$11.2 billion to over US$40.8 bil-
lion. Due to the financial and economic crises, the 
flows to Africa had been projected to fall to nearly 
US$38.2 billion in 2009, or a 6.3% decline from its 
2008 level (Table 2).
As Table 2 and Figure 2 show, in 2008, East Asia 
and the Pacific region remained the largest recipient 
of recorded remittances, followed by South Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, 
Europe and Central Asia, Africa (courtesy of favour-
able North African inflows), and the Middle East, in 
that order. This reversed the domination by Latin 
America and the Carribbean (LAC) regions in earlier 
years. In addition, for the first time in many years, 
remittance inflows to sub-Saharan Africa dominated 
those to North Africa (Figure 3). For example, in 
2008, flows to North Africa were US$19.7 billion as 
against US$21.1 billion to sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 2 Global flows of international migrant remittances (US$ million)















82,537 93,122 112,609 140,420 164,370 198,932 235,403 289,376 337,761 317,237 22.9 16.7 -6.1
East Asia 
and Pacific





12,143 11,647 12,844 14,418 20,955 30,089 37,341 50,777 57,081 49,279 36.0 13.8 -14.7
Latin and 
Caribbean





12,898 14,653 15,211 20,361 23,034 24,958 26,112 31,364 34,696 32,212 20.1 10.6 -7.2




4,623 4,663 5,030 5,970 8,021 9379 12,629 18,646 21,139 20,525 47.6 13.4 -2.9
Africa
NB: e = 
Estimated
11,231 12,442 12,948 15,578 19,509 22,479 26,575 36,913 40,842 38,145 38.90 10.64 -6.3
Source: Author’s Computations from World Bank (2009).59
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tional remittances in 2008 (in dollar terms) include 
Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. As a share 
of GDP, however, remittances to many of these 
countries were much smaller in 2008. In contrast, 
the top recipients in terms of the share of remit-
tances in GDP included smaller economies such as 
Lesotho and Togo, where remittances exceeded ten 
percent of the GDP (Figure 5).
Figure 2: International Remittances Recipients by Region in 2008 (%) 
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remittances in developing countries
Remittances have become one of the most signifi-
cant sources of foreign exchange for African coun-
tries. According to the World Bank (2006), offically 
recorded remittances to developing countries rose 
to an estimated USD167 billion in 2005. Due to the 
flows through informal channels, the true amount 
could be more than 50 percent higher. According 
to estimates by the International Fund for Agricul-
tural Development, IFAD, (2007), formal remittance 
to developing countries amounted to USD300 billion 
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 African Population Studies Vol  27, 1 (Apr 2013)in 2006, three times as much as official development 
assistance in the same year (Schuttler, 2008).
In addition to these remittances sent by individ-
ual migrants, money and goods are also transferred 
to countries of origin on a collective basis (Goldring, 
2003). Informal organised groups and registered 
associations of migrants pool funds on their own ini-
tiative or through a plan set up by government or by 
the group for a great variety of activities. Migrants 
collectively donate for humanitarian causes or as an 
investment in public infrastructure. Migrants’ organi-
sations’ scope, form and size are varied (Moya, 
2005) and there are home town associations (HTAs) 
with members from the same community in the 
country of origin, religious associations, sport clubs, 
professional associations, investment groups and 
political groups. However, only a minority of all 
migrant organisations aim at promoting develop-
ment in countries of origin (DeHaas, 2006). Funds 
sent on a collective basis thus only account for a 
small fraction of total remittances. Nevertheless, 
they represent a high quality resource because of 
their economic, social and political dimension, as 
well as the transfer of know-how that accompanies 
them (World Bank, 2002).
2.4 Social costs and benefits of migration
Migration in Africa has important effects on social 
issues that cannot be evaluated purely in economic 
terms (Ratha et al. 2011). These costs and benefits 
include their effects on gender roles and family 
cohesion.
2.4.1 Changes in gender role
Migration shapes values and attitudes toward gender 
roles within the household (Ghosh, 2009).
When women move, their role as caregivers 
changes; as a result, men are more likely to engage in 
traditionally female activities such as caring for chil-
dren and the elderly (King and Vullnetari, 2006). 
When men emigrate, women are empowered to 
take a more prominent part in community decision 
making, controlling their own income and expanding 
their role in the domestic sphere (DeshingKar and 
Grimm, 2005).
Recent migration flows have included a larger 
number of women who are migrating independently 
rather than following fathers or husbands (ECA, 
2006). Migration provides women with new eco-
nomic opportunities and sometimes an escape from 
a failed marriage, particularly in societies in which 
divorce is not an option. In traditional societies, 
where divorce is highly uncommon or not possible, 
migration has been associated with a higher proba-
bility of family breakdown. Although protracted sep-
aration can take its toll on family cohesion, Lucas 
(2005) points out that men and women whose mar-
riages were unstable to begin with are more likely to 
migrate. Gender differences are apparent in other 
ways. Manuh (2001) finds that Ghanaian men in Can-
ada are more likely than Ghanaian women to return 
home. For men, the attractiveness lies in the oppor-
tunity to go back to a patriarchal society, while 
women do not relish losing the independence they 
have experienced in Canada.





Region/country ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10e ’08-‘09 ’09-10e 2009
Nigeria 5435 9221 9980 9585 9975 -4.0 4.1 5.5
Sudan 1179 1769 3100 2993 3178 -3.5 6.2 5.5
Kenya 1128 1588 1692 1686 1758 -0.3 4.3 5.7
Senegal 925 1192 1288 1191 1164 7.5 2.3 9.3
South Africa 734 834 823 902 1008 9.7 11.8 0.3
Uganda 411 452 724 694 773 -4.1 11.3 4.3
Lesotho 361 451 439 450 525 2.6 16.7 28.5
Mali 212 344 431 405 385 -6.1 -4.8 4.5
Ethiopia 172 385 387 353 387 -8.8 9.7 1.2
Togo 232 284 337 307 302 -9.0 -1.7 10.7
Egypt, Arab Rep 5330 7656 8694 7150 7681 -17.8 7.4 3.8
Morocco 5451 6730 6895 6271 6447 -9.0 2.8 6.9
Algeria 1610 2120 2202 2059 2031 -6.5 -1.3 1.5
Tunisia 1510 1716 1977 1966 1960 -0.5 -0.3 5.0
Djibouti 28 29 30 28 28 -6.8 -0.3 2.7
Libya 16 16 16 14 16 -10.1 9.3 0.0
Source: World Bank (2011), migration and remittances unit, based on IMF balance of payment statistics. Note: e = estimated.62 http://aps.journals.ac.za/
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Migration may spread attitudes and behaviour from 
democratic host countries to less democratic spend-
ing countries through returning migrants, cross-bor-
der communications from Diaspora members, and 
information networks in migrant-spending commu-
nities (Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 2010). Although 
the decision to migrate may be made in the interest 
of household welfare, separation from one’s imme-
diate family often entails considerable emotional cost 
and can erode family structures and relationships 
(D’Emilio, Cordero, Bainvel, Skoog, Comini, Gough, 
Dias, Saab and Kilbane, 2007). A breakdown of fam-
ily ties because of emigration can impose significant 
emotional costs on children (Mckenzie and Rap-
oport, 2006). To some extent e-mail, text messages, 
and affordable telephone calls may allow transna-
tional families to thrive even at a distance (UNDP, 
2009). Recent evidence from Mozambique suggests 
that migration may also strengthen social networks 
by enabling households that receive remittances to 
participate more actively in their communities (Gal-
lego and Mendola, 2010).)
Table 2 shows selected African countries’ remit-
tance data from 2006 to 2010. In 2006, the sum of 
USD5.435 billion was remitted from aboard to 
Nigeria. From 2007 to 2009, the sum of USD9.221, 
USD9.980, and USD9.585 respectively were remit-
ted to Nigeria by Nigerian migrants abroad. In 2010, 
an estimated USD9.975 was also remitted to Nigeria 
from abroad. Migration plays a role in microfinance 
development. Microfinance, the provision of finan-
cial services to the poor, has emerged as stimulating 
sustainable development through local enterprises: 
micro, small and medium sizes. Migrants’ remit-
tances also play a major role in consumption expen-
ditures of households. An asset index composed of 
land, quality of housing, access to electricity and 
household amenities was used as a proxy for con-
sumption expenditure (Filmer and Pritchette, 2001). 
The evidence on whether skilled or unskilled 
migrants send larger remittances is mixed. Some 
studies suggest that skilled migrants remit less 
because they are more likely to settle down in their 
host countries and eventually bring their families 
(Niimi and Ozden, 2006; Faini, 2007). Other studies, 
based on micro-data, find a positive relationship 
between education and amounts remitted (Clem-
ens, 2009).
Table 3 shows remittance channels in Nigeria. As a 
result of the high cost and limited reach of formal 
channels, as well as the seasonal character of migra-
tion, informal channels play a large role in remittance 
transfers (Ratha et al. 2011). Remittances by hand 
during visits to hometowns accounted for 13.2%, 
within Africa. Remittances from outside Africa 
through money transfer operators have the highest 
figure, 57.1%. Informal channels were more preva-
lent for domestic money transfer, that is, remit-










Money transfer operator 57.1 35,2 6.3
Friend or relative 12.8 15.4 21.2
Direct transfer to bank account 11.8 12.1 35.0
Bank as paying agent for money transfer operator 10.5 17.6 2.6
Brought home by migrant during visit 5.4 13.2 27.2
Informal individual agent 2.5 4.4 4.1
Postal money order 0 1.1 0
Foreign exchange bureau 0 1.1 0.1
Credit union 0 0 0.2
Travel agency 0 0 0.4
Courier, bus or other transport 0 0 0.5
Mobile phone or telecom service provider 0 0 0.4
Prepaid card or atm card 0 0 0.2
Internet money transfer 0 0 0.1
Other 0 0 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ratha et al. (2011) based on results of household surveys conducted in Nigeria in 200963
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courier or other transport 0.5%; mobile phone 
0.4%, internet money transfer 0.1%; prepaid card 
0.2% and friend or relative 21.2%. In Nigeria, banks 
account for 37.6% of the volume of remittances and 
money transfer companies 6.3%.
Table 4 indicates that remittances are often spent on 
essential consumption, investment in physical and 
human capital, and expenditures that improve wel-
fare and productivity, including health, education and 
information and communication technology. Expen-
ditures on consumption (C) and investment (I) help 
to accelerate enterprise growth and development, 
and usually impact positively on national income 
accounting (Y=C+I), and the economic develop-
ment of Nigeria.
Taylor and Wyatt (1996) argue that the shadow 
value of remittances for overcoming risk and liquid-
ity constraints is particularly important to house-
holds in the low to middle income range, which 
otherwise tend to be credit constrained. In 1997, 
Osili (2004) conducted a survey of 112 Nigerian 
migrant households in Chicago and a matched sam-
ple of 61 families in Nigeria. 
She found that a third of remittances were spent 
on housing investment the preceding year and that 
migrants’ housing investment was responsive to 
change in macro-economic conditions such as infla-
tion, the real exchange rate and political stability. In 
rural Pakistan, international remittances raise the 
propensity to invest in agricultural land (Adams, 
1998). Remittance-receiving households that bene-
fited from an exchange rate shock spent more hours 
in self-employment and were more likely to start 
relatively capital-intensive entrepreneurial enter-
prises in the Philippines (Yang, 2008). Some recent 
studies (for example, Ashraf, Aycinena, Martinez and 
Yang, 2010) find that giving migrants more control 
over the use of remittances can increase savings 
rates among both migrants and remittance recipi-
ents. Abuse of human rights of the Nigerian migrants 
can exacerbate the inability of migrants to save and 
remit funds to Nigeria. Also, incessant and pro-
longed armed conflicts in countries with political 
instability can reduce the level of remittances, 
thereby affecting negatively the volume and growth 
of enterprises in Nigeria.
Remittances may increase expenditure on edu-
cation by helping finance schooling and reducing the 
need for child labour. Evidence from household sur-
veys in the table above shows that education was the 
second highest (22.1%) use of remittances from 
outside Africa. The data shows that remittance-
recipients in Nigeria spent more money on food, 
rather than committing the fund on the improve-
ment of farms.
3.0 Data and econometric technique 
In this study, our hypothesis is to examine the causal 
Table 4 Use of remittances by recipient households in Nigeria, by source of remittances (percent of total 
remittances)
Use NIGERIA
Outside Africa Within Africa Domestic
Food 10.1 20.1 1.0
Education 22.1 19.6 4.5
Health 5.1 12.0 10.6
Clothing - - -
Rent (house,land) 4.4 4.9 0.8
Cars/trucks 0.0 0.0 0.5
Marriage/funeral 0.4 1.0 0.7
Construction of new house 5.8 0.0 0.1
Rebuiding of house 4.7 3.2 7.0
Purchase of land 24.8 16.6 18.2
Improvement of farm - - -
Business 217 20.1 11.1
Investment - - -
Other 0.8 2.6 3.5
Source: Ratha et al. (2011), calculations based on results of household surveys conducted in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal 
and Uganda. Note: - means Negligible or missing64 http://aps.journals.ac.za/
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(GDP), Migration and Workers Remittances from 
abroad and Nigerian Economic growth for the 
period 2000-20010.This study makes use of Time 
Series Data. The sources of the data are annual 
reports and Statement of Accounts of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Federal Bureau of Statis-
tics, (FBS) Nigeria, World Bank, International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and International Labour 
Organization (ILO). 
The data involved for this study cover the Gross 
domestic product (GDP) and Remittances for the 
period 2000-2010.
The model
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to determine 
the causal relationship between Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), Remittances and Economic Growth 
in the Nigerian economy for the period of 2000-
2010.
Following John Anyanwu (2011); Israel Katega 
(2010) and Nilanjan Banik & Yoonus (2009) specifica-
tion as a benchmark, we calculate the relationship 
between Gross domestic product (GDP), Remit-
tances and economic growth in the Nigerian econ-
omy based on the following equation:
  (1)
Specifically, 
∆1n GDPit = β0, + β1 ∆1nREMit +εi          (2)
(I = 1…N, t = 1…Ti)
Where In = is the natural logarithm
      GDPt= is the gross domestic product (A proxy 
for growth)
         REMt= is the inflow of Remittances received in 
Nigeria 
          β0, = is the constant term
          β1 = is the slope 
          εi= error term.
For this study, in this empirical analysis, linear regres-
sion OLS test would be used to trace the effects of 
Remittances on GDP. Other economic tests such as 
stationarity test (using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test), the unit roots tests, co-integration and 
error correction mechanism were also performed to 
determine the stationarity of the data and long-run 
relationship between the variables.
3.1 Interpretation of the results
We intend to examine if a long-run relationship 
exists between economic growth and workers’ 
remittances in Nigeria. Thus, in line with the practice 
in time series econometrics, we move from first 
testing for the existence of unit roots in the data to 
testing for the existence of a stable long-run relation-
ship by using cointegration tests. Subsequently, if we 
find evidence of cointegration, long run estimates 
can be obtained.
Unit root tests were conducted for all variables 
in the model and the results are presented in Table 5 
below. Both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
and Philips Perron (PP) unit root tests were con-
ducted.
Data diagnostics
As specified earlier, the variables to be employed in 
this study in line with the model specifications are: 
GDP (gross domestic product), and FDI (foreign 
direct investment). A graphical diagnostic represen-
tation of the behaviour of the economic variables 
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Unit root tests are conducted for the variables using 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test; the results are 
presented in the table that follows. Note that the 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values for the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test using the Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC) method at 1%, 5% and 10% sig-
nificance level are -4.803492, -3.403313 and 
-2.841819 respectively. Stationarity (unit root) tests 
conducted for the set of variables enumerated above 
revealed that the variables are I(1) and I(2) variables 
(integrated of order 1 and 2). That is, they are not 
stationary at levels but are all stationary at their vari-

















00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
GDP
 
Figure 1 A graphical representation of the behavior of the economic variables used
Table 1 Stationarity test
Variables Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) @ Levels 
Test statistic
Order of integration 
Max. no of lags
GDP -9.903103** I (1) 9
REMIT -3.154489** I (2) 9
Notes: * indicates significant at ** significant at the 5% level,
Source: Author’s Computation66 http://aps.journals.ac.za/
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Discussion
Table 2 above presents the cointegration result for 
the combined variables. Here, it is observed that the 
variables in the equation are cointegrated; the exist-
ence of this cointegration implies that there is a long-
run equilibrium relationship existing between the 
variables in the equation. This is to say that if a set of 
variables are cointegrated, the effects of a shock to 
one variable spread to the others, possibly with time 
lags, so as to preserve a long-run relationship 
between the variables. The existence of this long-
run relationship is the basis for the short-run disequi-
librium adjustment in the model generally known as 
error correction mechanism (ECM), the result of 
which is presented in Table 3 above.
It is observable from the results, given the value 
of the R2 (adjusted), that the independent variable in 
the model significantly explains changes in gross 
domestic position of Nigeria as about 97% of 
changes in the GDP of the country are attributed to 
the independent variable. The model is significant 
overall given the probability value of the F-statistic. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic only corroborates find-
ings that the residual of the model contains insignifi-
cant serial correlation.
 Coming down to the variables in the model, it is 
evident that the inclusion of the immediate past 
period lagged of the dependent variable captures 
Table 2 Cointegration result
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: LGDP LREMIT 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesised Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None *  0.807113  22.17260  15.49471  0.0042
At most 1 *  0.675648  9.007401  3.841466  0.0027
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
Table 3 Error correction result
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 3.789367 1.088011 3.482840 0.0400
REMIT -1.27E-06 2.65E-05 -0.048194 0.9646
LREMIT (-1) 1.462778 0.223222 6.553029 0.0072
LREMIT (-2) -0.024630 0.201755 -0.122076 0.9106
ECM (-1) -0.792937 0.185273 -4.279829 0.0234
R-squared 0.988678     Mean dependent var 16.50708
Adjusted R-squared 0.973581     S.D. dependent var 0.482217
S.E. of regression 0.078379     Akaike info criterion -1.985353
Sum squared resid 0.018430     Schwarz criterion -1.935702
Log likelihood 12.94141     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.320229
F-statistic 65.49056     Durbin-Watson stat 2.051055
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00299167
http://aps.journals.ac.za/
 African Population Studies Vol  27, 1 (Apr 2013)part of the changes in GDP accumulation. 
The result for Remittances (REMIT) inflows is 
positive and significant in the first period but for the 
second, third and fourth period lags that is other-
wise. As regards the effect and significance of these 
variables on Nigeria’s Growth incidence (GDP), the 
result found, in line with the anticipation of this 
study, that the size of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) increases with inflow of remittances. Eco-
nomic theory suggests further that with the inflow of 
remittances there will be adequate improvement in 
the recipient standard of living, provision of employ-
ment and infrastructure, thus leading to general ele-
vation from poverty, thereby obviating the necessity 
of de-accumulating the stock of reserves for these 
purposes. This result also confirms what Soludo 
(2007) emphasised concerning the positive impact of 
the variables on reserve accumulation of the coun-
try. 
4.0 Conclusion
The objective of this study was to explore empiri-
cally the relationship between remittances (REMIT) 
and GDP growth in Nigeria. Data were collected 
from secondary sources and analysed with the aim 
of achieving the stated objectives. From the findings 
of the study the following can be inferred: remit-
tances are positively and significantly viable in their 
contribution to economic growth (proxy by GDP) in 
origin countries as evident in Nigeria. 
Secondly, it is observed that workers’ remit-
tances sent to their places of origin in the form of 
cash and goods play a very important role in subsi-
dising households’ livelihoods as they are used to 
purchase food and consumer goods, paying for med-
icine and health care, paying for education of the 
young as well as investing in long term capital 
projects such as paying for house/land rent, business, 
rebuilding of houses and the purchase of land.
4.1 Policy implications
First, remittances-receiving countries of Africa 
(especially Nigeria) need to develop a strategy to 
maximise the benefits of remittances while minimis-
ing their negative repercussions. Second, Nigerian 
governments should design complementary policies 
to mitigate the adverse income distribution conse-
quences of remittances. Such mitigation policies may 
range from setting up or improving safety nets, to 
better labour-market policies and institutions, and to 
investing in access roads to improve access by the 
poor to markets.
Third, well-designed additional policy interven-
tions, especially those that improve education and 
infrastructure and address other “behind the bor-
der” investment climate reforms, can mitigate the 
adverse inequity changes that may result from inter-
national migrant transfers (ILO, 2004) Greater 
access to education will help reduce income inequal-
ity in African countries. Thus, bottlenecks in the sup-
ply of educated and skilled labour may condemn 
African countries to high levels of income inequality 
(World Bank, 2007b).
Fourth, the government and development col-
laborating agencies such as NGOs should devise 
ways of assisting migrants in their economic activities 
and encourage them to continue sending remit-
tances to their places of origin.
Fifth, local government authorities (LGAs) 
should strive to create enabling environments for 
the petty businesses in the informal sector to flourish 
given that they are the businesses that employ most 
of the migrants’ remittances.
Sixth, the LGAs and other development practi-
tioners should educate and encourage urban and 
rural households that receive international remit-
tances to use them positively and efficiently espe-
cially by investing in productive activities such as 
farming, livestock keeping, bee-keeping, fishing and 
other viable non-agricultural economic activities 
such as carpentry.
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